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Abstract
The advent of digital information technology heralded the concept of information warfare. This ‘preliminary’
stage in the 1990s really consisted of technology warfare where the networks, upon which combat relied, were
seen as weapons to gain ‘information superiority’. This was the inception of the technological aspect of
Information Warfare. The realisation of the effectiveness of electronic networks to optimize organisational
communication was taken up by industry, the military and terrorist groups alike. As society quickly became
more reliant on digital networks to run its critical functions, it became apparent that this infrastructure was
vulnerable and needed protection (as well as being a target for offensive operations).The next stage was the
emphasis not on the technology but the information which it stored and processed. This was the ‘information’
stage of Information Warfare (now renamed Information Operations to reflect its expanded scope). This stage
developed further and gradually started to include elements such as public relations, and strategic
communications This paper examines the development of these elements and their use by terrorist groups. It
concentrates on the contemporary manifestations of Influence Wars.
Keywords
Information Operations, Information Terrorism, Influence Campaigns, Psychological Warfare.

THE ‘NEW’ ENVIRONMENT
There is general agreement that the ‘new’ form of trans-national terrorism has change the complexion of
terrorism in the last decade. The main trends pertaining to these trans-national groups are:
•

The development of loose networks / ad hoc groups as the preferred modus operandi;

•

A new attitude towards violence including suicide bombing;

•

Religious based groups rather than nationalistic;

•

Operations facilitated by Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) and mobile
technologies;

•

Ideas and worldviews bind them together rather than just political aspirations;

•

They have less need for direct state sponsorship;

•

Groups appeal to diasporas rather than just domestic audiences; and

•

They have the potential to use Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons.
(Arquilla et al., 1999; Hoffman, 1998, 1999; Medhurst, 2002)

In the era of globalization, terrorism itself has been globalized. The ‘new’ terrorist organisations are loosely
organized into groups that have some centrally espoused worldview (such as Al Qaeda) but not necessarily a
centralised organisational structure. There is a trend towards religious based groups rather than nationalistic, and
these group tend to be much more lethal. In fact, all trans-national groups are religious in nature. Because of
their religious /cultural focus they tend to get support from sympathisers in religious/ethnic communities in
disparate countries. These are mostly first or second generation immigrants in Western nations although there is
still a core of support in the countries of origin. At this time, the major globalised religious groups are based
around radical Islam. The advent since the early 1990s of global communications and mass media has
empowered these groups to use these media as tools for command and control, collections of funds, and also

importantly to provide them with a worldwide audience for their views. For instance, the low cost of Internet
web pages enables terrorist groups to publish material to a global audience. In fact, in the early 1990s, terrorist
groups of all kinds were the first to fully exploit this developing medium. The evolution of the use of these
technologies developed in tandem with their use by Western government and militaries.

INFORMATION TERRORISM
The concept of information terrorism has its origins in the ideas that surrounded information warfare. Libicki
(1995) first described the elements of information warfare to be seven subtypes of warfare: Command and
Control, Intelligence Based, Hacker, Electronic, Psychological, Cyber and Economic based information warfare.
Information warfare in its early stages was very much focused on exploiting the new technologies to gain
advantage. Whilst there was an element of psychological warfare, it was predominantly about command and
control and disruption of enemy systems. As the potential of these technologies to influence both friend and foe
was realised, there was a renewed focus on this aspect. As the wars of the late 1990s’ became more politicised,
the advantage of information dominance (or information superiority), began to be recognised and were used in
both times of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ – as the distinction between these two states faded. The term Information
Operations was coined to superseded the more dramatic information warfare (which is now a sub-set of
information operations to be used in times of open conflict).
In this paper Information terrorism is defined as the practice of information operations by those deemed to be
terrorists. Figure 1 illustrates some of the elements of information operations/ information terrorism.

Hard technological
elements

Soft Human oriented
elements
Psychologically/Interpretive
oriented strategies

Instrumentally oriented
strategies

O f f e n s i v e

Physical
destruction

Physical
security

‘Attack’
Software

TechnoAttackers

Network
Security
security
Procedures
software

D

e

f

e

n

a c t i o n s

Counterintelligence,
Social engineering Active
intelligence
collection
Operational security

s i

v

e

Psychological
operations,
Influence
campaigns

Environmental scanning
Intelligence Analysis

a c t i o n s

Figure 1: Examples of the Elements of Information Operations/Terrorism
It can be seen from Figure 1 that information terrorism consists of a variety of components ranging from
technology (instrumentally) based approaches to human (psychologically) based activities. In a way, this
describes the development of the emphasis of information operations over the last two decades. It has both
defensive and offensive modes. This paper concentrates on the human/psychologically oriented offensive
strategies used by terrorist groups.
Information Operations (IO) has developed into a truly
Information/Knowledge Age phenomenon, as Hall (2003, p.97) illustrates:
Information operations of the future will rely on both a philosophy and a set of tools. The philosophy
of IO acknowledges the emergence and importance of knowledge war and its direct connection to
knowledge-based strategies and knowledge-based operations. The philosophy acknowledges the preeminence of information and knowledge as they contribute to effective decision making, as well as the
importance of thinking planning and perceptions from two points of view: ours and the adversary’s.
The IO suite of tools will be used to attack the thinking, planning, decision-making processes, the

mechanical turning of data into information and information into knowledge, and the machinery
supporting the decision making cycles of our adversaries.
Whilst this is written from a conventional military perspective, it captures the essence of the use of information
operations by terrorists and government agencies in conflict with them.
Table 1 outlines some of the components of contemporary information terrorism. Whilst there are a number of
Command and Control and Cyber war elements, it is the Influence functions components that dominate.
Table 1: Contemporary factors influencing Information Terrorism
CYBERWAR FUNCTIONS:
• Attack technology by using:
 Logic bombs, viruses, worms, spy-ware, flooding, DOS attacks, Web defacement
• Defend technology by using:
 Virus checkers, network tools, network forensics, standards, backups, intrusion detection
systems, honeypots, training
ORGANISATIONAL (COMMAND AND CONTROL) FUNCTIONS:
• Coordinating activities:
 Network centric organisations using such elements as the Web, SMS, coordinated sensors,
and streaming video.
• Bind supporters and spread message:
 Use the Web and the mass media to promote cause to a global audience. Use the Web to
collect monies.
MIND/INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS:
• Contemporary audience
 Globalized reach of communications has given the ability to reach anyone/anywhere.
• Strategic communications
 Influence campaigns are now an integral part of national and terrorist strategy. Each has
its own targeted constituency in the globalized information environment.
• Terrorism is psychological warfare
 Violence as communication.
 Goals cannot be obtained by violence alone.
 Victims must be enlisted to gain objectives.
 Persistent campaign with the target population increasingly perceiving (irrationally?)
risk.
 Boost its supporters, frighten it opponents.
 Seek to undermine beliefs in the collective values of society.
 Terrorists uses the victims’ imagination against themselves
• Technology of the despised West is used against it
 Even the Taliban, who are averse to technology, had a Web site.
 Web and other technologies such as SMS are more difficult to censor.
 Terrorists’ Web sites are better suited to their target audiences than ‘official’ sites.
 Effective use of video imagery on Web and, subsequently, the mass media.
• Technology has decreased the West’s dominance of mass communication.
 The terrorists’ strategy is recognises the importance of having information/influence
practices.
 The importance of the media is shown by the increase in violent targeting of broadcasters
by Western militaries and governments
 Censorship of the Web is increasing although terrorists seem to be able to combat this
It is the Mind/Influence functions that will be further discussed below.

INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TERRORIST GROUPS
Terrorism can predominantly be considered as asymmetric warfare fought mostly as psychological warfare.
Psychological warfare is a term used to describe the suite of actions that consists of violence or the threat of
violence plus some form of psychological operations. Psychological operations consist of actions such as
disinformation, deception, propaganda, and showing force (Goldstein and Jacobowitz, 1996). In its most
successful form, it can create a victory without the need to use force. Traditionally, it has been considered
another way of making the enemy surrender. However, its tactics can be used to both destroy the ‘will’ of the

enemy, and boost the ‘will’ of supporters. In contemporary terrorist actions the actors are the terrorists
themselves, their supporters, those that are neutral, plus governments and global publics. Terrorists know that
they cannot win using violence alone as, militarily, they are in a weaker position.
The violent components of terrorist actions are symbolic and designed to send a (political) message (Tuman,
2003). In a sense, if there was no message to be understood by the targeted audience then such things as
bombings and shootings would have no objective except violence itself. Although certain religious based
terrorist groups do seem to want to maximise body counts (Medhurst, 2002), there is still an underlying political
message. Tuman (2003, pp. 46-48) states that symbolic acts of violence should be analysed using the following
factors: the intent of the communication, the context of the communication, and the relativity of the symbolic
message. Each of these acts of violence has primary, secondary, and tertiary targets or audiences. For instance
the attacks on September 11th, 2001 on New York and Washington had the immediate target of the victims of the
violence, secondary targets such as the American government and public and the global Islamic population, and
tertiary audiences in Europe and other countries. The symbolism of the attacks and their targets were numerous;
they were attacks on the US military (the Pentagon), its government (the failed attempts on the Whitehouse
/Capitol), and the capitalist economic/trading systems (the World Trade Centre). Also, it could be considered an
attack on the invulnerability of the American ‘homeland’, and modernity (represented by the architecture of the
World Trade Centre).
However, these attacks are the determinants of whether a group is considered to be a terrorist group or not:
much of the influence effort goes around these events. The acts of violence by themselves are almost
meaningless without messages and context. Whilst the violence is a form of messaging, the underlying
political/religious objectives of these acts need to be communicated. Hence, each message must have a context,
and intent, and a targeted audience. The latter might involves varies degrees of impact depending on the
audience targeted.
Also, there is a need for the terrorists to target various stages of influence in their desired audiences. For
instance, radical Islamists desire long term goals and, as such, temporary disturbances that will be forgotten in a
short period might be tactically beneficial to them but must be a part of a longer term strategic plan. Figure 2
explains the types of influence, their relative gestation period and their outcomes.
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Figure 2: Elements of Strategic Influence /Psychological Operations
The short term tactics of enticement and coercion are really a classic psychological warfare method.
Compliance might be obtained but belief systems are not altered. So whilst intimidation might provide
short term changes in behaviour, the underlying political message has not necessarily been accepted
by the target audience. The next step to obtain conformity in the target audience is more difficult to
achieve. Inducements such as peer pressure, and the credibility of the message and presenter assist in
bringing about this medium term goal (Cragin and Gerwehr, 2005, pp.17-19). For terrorist groups, this
outcome can realised in areas where the message has some context. For instance, for Islamic terrorist
groups, in regions with a high proportion of Muslims. Once the social context has been controlled, the
next long term step is to progress to the conversion stage where the audience is more or less
controlled by the influencer. Religious schools or tightly controlled states produce this long term
outcome, and fewer inducements have to be given relative to the changes in the other two stages.
The campaign by Al Qaeda can be seen in this light. The first stage was highlighted by spectacular
violent events that brought short term visibility, and targeted the Muslim ummah. This stage showed

the West being coerced and sent out the message that the oppression of Muslim by the West was being
fought by Al Qaeda. Reactions by the West and the social consequences that this caused in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Palestine, and other areas such a Chechnya created a social and political environment
that was conducive to conversion, or partial conversion, of Muslims to Al Qaeda’s cause. In certain
areas, this process has radicalised portions of the Islamic population and encouraged the development
of radical Islamic schools or maddrasses.
Persuasive communication must go through a series of steps before it is transformed into action.
Firstly, the audience must be exposed to the message. In terms of successful terrorist groups, this is
usually achieved by some spectacular act of violence that it relayed through the mass media and then
followed up by Web page entries. Sometimes the event is transmitted through the Web first and then
picked up by the media, for instance, beheadings of hostages in the 2002 - 2005 period. The message
must then receive attention by the audience: that is, it must be noticed by the target audience and not
lost in the ‘noise’ of other messages. The audience must then comprehend the message so it should be
presented in a way that is understandable to that audience. The audience must then accept the
message, which means that it must fit into their worldviews. The message should have a length of
retention that enables it to be translated from the cognitive domain into behavioural change (Cragin
and Gerwehr, 2005). Each of these stages needs to be successful to obtain the three outcomes listed in
Figure 2. The success of the radical Islamists in the last decade is that they have achieved all three
stages in some form or another, by a concerted information operations effort that has involved targeted
violence that has symbolic significance to both friend and foe They have not only managed to create a
global movement from a small number of people, but to convert a significant number of others to their
cause.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND INFLUENCE
The development of the Internet, mobile technologies, and global communications has enabled many
terrorist groups to access cheap means to send their messages to the world. Whilst terrorists use the
Internet for instrumental purposes such as fundraising and command and control, there is now the
capability to perform psychological and propaganda operations on a scale not available until the mid1990s. As Weinman (2004, 2006) states; the Internet offers, easy access, anonymity, a global audience,
low cost presence, a relatively uncensored environment, an ability to by-pass the formal mass media,
and a presentation capability from multimedia products to achieve a strong impact.
Almost all terrorist organisations have a Web presence – even the technologically averse Taliban. The
sites promote their cause in the best light as any other government or commercial site would do. Each
is designed to present to and, sometimes mobilise, current and potential supporters as well as public
opinion their view of the world and to promote their agenda.
Other innovations such as ‘Captology’ (Fogg, 2003) will enable all Web users to exploit the influencing
potential of Web sites and their associated multimedia content. (Captology is an acronym based on the phrase
computers and persuasive technologies). It aims to use design to further behaviour and attitude change,
compliance motivation, and changes in worldview (ibid, p.5) .Whilst this is still at an early stage, this new
design emphasis might have high potential to government, industry and terrorist organisations. Whilst
Captology is limited to conventional computers presentation, other technologies such as mobile devices will
become vulnerable to influence campaigns.

CONCLUSION
Information terrorism has many components from cyber-terrorism (or the threat of cyber-terrorism – cyberfear), to command and control to psychological operations. This paper has outlined the function of influence in
this mix. Of course, each component is an integral part of the other. For instance, the use of cyber-fear could be
used in an influence campaign as a coercive tool. It is interesting to observe that the skills needed to run
effective public relations campaigns in ‘conventional’ organisations has been exploited to the full by terrorist
related groups to the point that it could be argued that they can control the mass media’s agenda.
As the concept of information operations has matured, there has been increasing emphasis on the persuasive and
influential components of information operations and less on the technological based concept of network wars.
Both are still important but the 21st century has seen the concept of a ‘mind war’ come to the fore. Of course,
this is nothing new as history is littered with examples of mind wars, for instance the French Wars of religion in
the sixteenth century, which used the printing press as its tool, or the Cold War of the twentieth century, which
used radio and television as its tools to promulgate ideas.
However, the ability to communicate globally and the development of psychological methods to coerce,
influence or persuade has potentially increased their effectiveness. Terrorists know this and their aim is to sell

their ideas to achieve power or other goals. Whilst the conflict is asymmetric, with the military might in favour
of the terrorists’ enemies, then psychological warfare is their most effective option.
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